Nuclear Experts Sound Alarm Over Iran Deal's Uranium Verification Gaps

Talks Postponed as Clock Ticks on 60-Day Negotiation Window

The Trump administration's newly signed memorandum of understanding with Iran is drawing sharp criticism from nuclear nonproliferation experts who warn the framework may leave Tehran with too much control over its enriched uranium stockpile unless inspectors can first locate, secure, and verify the material.

The agreement, which sets the stage for a final nuclear deal, identifies on-site "downblending"—diluting enriched uranium so it becomes unsuitable for weapons use—as the minimum acceptable approach for handling Iran's nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. However, the MOU does not explicitly commit Iran to relinquishing its civilian nuclear program, instead stating that both sides will discuss enrichment and Iran's "nuclear needs" in subsequent negotiations.

A senior administration official, speaking on background, said the MOU requires Iran to reaffirm it will not pursue or develop nuclear weapons—a significant development under the country's new Supreme Leader. The official emphasized that the U.S. has already held productive discussions with Iran regarding enriched uranium stockpiles, nuclear site dismantlement, an enrichment ban, and inspection access, and that negotiators now have 60 days to transform these understandings into binding commitments.

Vice President JD Vance offered a more measured assessment Thursday, noting that the deal's benefits remain contingent on Iranian compliance.

"They have promised not to enrich. They have promised that they would allow inspectors in to destroy that highly enriched stockpile," Vance said. "They promised a number of things, and that's why the deal contemplates a number of benefits if they do those things. But it doesn't do anything if they don't actually meet those promises."

The warnings from outside experts gain urgency from a recent IAEA report showing the agency's severely limited visibility into Iran's declared nuclear program following last year's military strikes. According to the report, aside from a single inspection at an Iranian nuclear power plant, the agency "has not received information from Iran" about the status of other declared nuclear facilities or associated materials. "Nor has the Agency had access" to those sites for in-field verification.

Chuck DeVore, chief national initiatives officer at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, said any credible agreement must prioritize immediate, unrestricted access for inspectors.

"Unfettered verification is everything," DeVore told this outlet. "There can be no denial for teams to inspect on the ground. Remote, technological means can achieve a lot, but nothing beats in-person inspections."

DeVore, who worked on verification issues during Cold War-era nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union as a Reagan administration official, cautioned against repeating what he called a critical flaw in the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

"In those negotiations, the danger was that the minimum level of verification sought by defense and intelligence officials could become the starting point for diplomats," he explained. "Once you say, 'This is the minimum we need,' then that becomes the starting point, so anything agreed to is less than that. That's what I fear."

Andrea Stricker, deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Nonproliferation Program, offered a similarly stark assessment. She argued that recovering and safeguarding Iran's enriched uranium must come first—Tehran cannot be permitted to retain control while material is diluted domestically.

"Without verifiably dismantling and destroying all of Iran's fundamental nuclear capabilities—nuclear material, facilities, centrifuges, manufacturing capabilities, equipment, documentation, and weaponization capacities, and ensuring scientists are redirected to civilian work—Iran's pledge on paper is meaningless," Stricker said.

According to Stricker, Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, if further processed, could yield enough weapons-grade material for approximately 22 nuclear weapons. DeVore declined to assign a single number, noting that estimates depend heavily on weapon design sophistication.

He estimated Iran possesses roughly 1,000 pounds of 60% enriched uranium, which on-site downblending—properly verified—would render unusable for further enrichment. However, DeVore emphasized the material would still require additional processing to become weapons-grade, and he expressed confidence Tehran cannot currently perform that processing because key facilities were destroyed in last year's strikes.

The follow-up technical negotiations that were scheduled to launch in Switzerland have been postponed, leaving critical nuclear details unresolved as the 60-day window for a final agreement begins. Meanwhile, questions about IAEA access and verification authority remain unanswered, with the agency declining to comment on whether it can currently account for Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.