The history behind the U.S. competition with China
When President Richard Nixon landed in Beijing in 1972, he ended more than two decades of U.S.‑China estrangement and opened a new chapter in global geopolitics. Nearly five decades later, that historic opening has evolved into a complex rivalry that spans trade, technology and, increasingly, military power.
Zhou Bo, a former senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army who now serves as a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, says the shift is undeniable. “China’s rise is inevitable,” he told an audience this week. “It’s not rising. It’s already risen.” Zhou, who joined the PLA in 1979 at the start of a period of rapid reform, emphasized that while the United States still possesses the world’s strongest military, China has set a clear target: to become a world‑class force by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
The trajectory from Mao to today illustrates how ambition has been matched with strategy. Under Mao Zedong, the PLA swelled to as many as 6.5 million troops, a number that underscored sheer mass rather than technological edge. When Deng Xiaoping rose to paramount leadership, the focus changed to quality over quantity. Troop numbers were trimmed, and resources were funneled into modernizing weapons, advancing aerospace and building a navy capable of projecting power far beyond China’s coastline.
By the early 2000s, China had significantly expanded its naval fleet, nuclear warhead stockpile and missile arsenal—assets now on par with those of the United States in several categories. “Between the two countries there is an element of competition,” Zhou observed. “China’s strength is growing, and it is closing the gap with the United States.”
That closing gap has spilled into the heavens. In 2007, the PLA conducted a kinetic anti‑satellite test, destroying a defunct weather satellite in low Earth orbit with a ground‑launched missile. The demonstration proved China possessed an anti‑satellite (ASAT) capability and signaled its willingness to operate in the space domain. “We definitely have this kind of capability, called ASAT capability, of launching missiles to target satellites,” Zhou said. He added that defining what constitutes a weapon in space remains a murky issue, a point echoed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which assessed that the PLA may already have ASAT tools that can reach higher orbits and is actively developing a suite of counterspace technologies.
The militarization of space has added a new dimension to U.S.–China relations. While Beijing maintains that it has no intention of placing weapons in space, its officials acknowledge that space is increasingly viewed as a sphere for achieving superiority. “We have so many troubles on Earth, and why should we even have weapons in space to strike our own homeland?” Zhou asked, underscoring a stance that emphasizes defense over offensive space warfare.
The tension in the military arena is mirrored by a fierce contest over emerging technologies, especially artificial intelligence. President Donald Trump, during a recent visit to Beijing, declared that the United States is “leading China by a lot.” This week he signed an executive order on AI that would allow the federal government to review advanced systems before they are released publicly. The order, which had been postponed earlier over concerns that it could hamper U.S. firms in the competitive race with China, reflects the administration’s push to maintain technological primacy.
Henry Wang, founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization, offered a more nuanced perspective. “The U.S. has a system that works well in the U.S.; China has a system that works well in China, but that does not mean the two systems cannot develop in parallel,” he said. Wang noted that China’s massive population—1.4 billion people, nearly all smartphone users—provides a rich data environment that can accelerate AI training. “In terms of data generation, China probably is the richest,” he added, while acknowledging that the United States still leads in innovation and hosts several of the world’s largest AI companies.
The rapid advancement of AI has prompted calls for international regulation. Experts in both nations argue that guardrails are needed, yet the regulatory landscape remains largely uncharted. “We don’t have anything to regulate,” Wang admitted. Zhou emphasized that consensus at the highest levels is essential for managing the competition responsibly. “We’re not talking about strategic rivalry anymore; we talk about strategic stability, and the U.S. and China should achieve strategic stability not only for the benefit of both countries but for the world,” Wang said.
Public opinion in the United States mirrors the uncertainty. A recent Fox News Poll found that 51 % of registered voters favor coordinating AI policy with other nations, while 49 % prefer the United States to act independently. The split underscores the broader challenge facing policymakers: balancing competitive drive with cooperative necessity.
Trump, speaking from Beijing, acknowledged the difficulty of imposing limits while the two powers are vying for advantage. “It’s a little hard to say, ‘oh gee, let’s put on guard rails while we’re competing with each other,’ ” he said. Yet he expressed optimism about AI’s potential, particularly in medicine. “In medicine, some of the things that are coming up, some of the cures they’re coming up with that people would have never gotten—there—it's gonna be mostly a good thing.”
As the United States and China navigate an era of intertwined competition and interdependence, officials on both sides stress the importance of dialogue. The hope is that strategic stability—backed by clear communication, mutual respect and coordinated efforts on shared challenges such as AI governance—will prevent miscalculation and keep the relationship from tipping into outright conflict. The world watches closely, aware that the decisions made today over troops, missiles, satellites and algorithms will shape the global order for decades to come.